Venezuela's Opposition Suffers Moral Defeat in 2010 Parliamentary Elections
By Raul Burbano
Raul Burbano was an official International Observer in Venezuela's September 26, 2010parliamentary elections. Raul is a member of the Latin American and Caribbean Solidarity Network and the Venezuela We Are With You Coalition.
It was 2:30 a.m. on September 27 when the President of the National Electoral Council (CNE), Tibisay Lucena, walked into the press conference at the head office of the CNE and announced the first official results of the previous day's Parliamentary Elections.
The United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) had once again defeated their opposition and obtained a clear majority of seats in Parliament -- 96 of 165. Although this was not the two-thirds majority that some in the PSUV had hoped for, it was a clear sign that the majority of Venezuelans continue to support the process of transformation that President Hugo Chavez has led over the past ten years. By this time, most local media and International Observers had gone home, while others slouched, partially asleep in their chairs.
The rightist opposition, realizing that they had failed to take control of the Parliament, immediately swung into spin mode, trying to massage the results in their favor. The opposition hailed its win of 65 parliamentary seats as a major setback for the Chavista camp. The international mainstream media parroted reports that Venezuelan's had rejected "Chavismo."
Few media pundits asked why the opposition couldn't win a majority. Judging by media reports, you'd think Venezuela is about the worse place in the world to live. Thus the Brookings Institute: "Private investment and oil production are imploding, GDP has fallen 14% since 2008, and inflation runs at 30 percent." (1) And the New York Times reported (August 2010): "Venezuela is more deadly than Iraq."
And yet, despite this supposed national calamity and government incompetence, the opposition failed to win a simple majority in Parliament. Obviously, the majority of the Venezuelan people see past the façade of the oppositions unity speeches. History has taught them that the traditional parties and institutions are merely proxies for those living comfortably in Miami.
Opposition's myth of majority popular vote
Early on as people started to digest the results, the opposition moved to conceal their moral loss. Out of the blue the head of the opposition party declared victory, claiming 52% of the national popular vote. The next morning Chavez, on national TV, with the CNE numbers in one hand and a simple map of Venezuela in the other, walked the nation through a simple arithmetic lesson: the PSUV received 5,422,040 votes and the opposition 5,320,175. This is a 50.5% versus 49.5% in favor of the PSUV.
The opposition boasted that they won more seats in this parliamentary election then in the last one held in 2005. What they neglected to explain was that they had boycotted the previous elections in an effort to delegitimize the electoral process. According to Roy Chaderton, a PSUV member elected to the Latin American Parliament (Parlatino), the opposition actually lost ground by losing 20 seats in the National Assembly when compared to the last elections in which the opposition participated in.
Opposition lacks true base of support
It is not hard to see that opposition lacks credibility or any substantial support. This can be shown by the fact that since 1999 the PSUV has handed the opposition 14 electoral defeats. By simply looking at the total votes that the opposition received nationally, it's hard to fully appreciate their true lack of popular support. The majority of their support lies within the country's small oligarchy that is aligned with foreign multinationals. According to Eva Golinger, "U.S. agencies fund and design their campaigns, train and build their parties, organize their NGOs, develop their messages, select their candidates and feed them with dollars to ensure survival." (2)
What the opposition lacks in popular support they make up in limitless financial support from the U.S., and a sophisticated network of foreign-trained media outlets. A report published in May 2010 by the Spanish Foundation for International Relations and Foreign Dialogue revealed that this year alone, US AID and their proxies invested in the neighborhood of $40 million-$50 million to shape the results of these Parliamentary elections. Their plan was simple: unite, train and guide the opposition in Venezuela because alone they would stand little chance of electoral victory. They aimed to retool their message to appeal to the masses by "development of strategies and messages that addressed the aspirations of low-income voters". (3)
Opposition accuses CNE of fraud
In order to try and discredit the process, the opposition tried to call into question the integrity of the CNE and their electoral process. Surely, with such a highly sophisticated and automated electoral system, there must have been fraud -- why else the delay of several hours in providing the results. So went the opposition's logic. One could suppose the opposition suffers from collective amnesia since they had forgotten that it was the same CNE that in the 2008 constitutional vote awarded them their first and only electoral victory against President Chavez. The CNE attributed this brief delay to the fact that results being too close to call and to the need to wait until the results were "irreversible." However, for the opposition this was just the start of their frantic attempt to rationalize and justify their moral defeat.
The National Electoral Council recognized 150 observers from across the globe to witness Venezuela's democratic process. Each party or alliance participating in the elections was permitted to invite up to 30 partisan witnesses from abroad. In addition, thousands of volunteers selected through a national lottery from across the country participated in the electoral process. These volunteers ran the 12,562 voting centers and 36,773 voting tables across the country ensuring massive and diverse civil participation and oversight.
The final report by the International observers was unanimous, and was summarized by the European Union International Electorate team: "The election process has been unique regarding the democratic guarantees and the voters' individual rights, the respect for vote's secrecy, and the transparency of the process." The opposition quickly realized that the very sophistication, transparency and inclusive nature of the electoral process did not lend itself to charges of fraud or manipulation and moved to their next target.
Opposition accuses Chavez of redrawing electoral districts
Venezuela's electoral system is a complicated hybrid system that includes both first-past-the-post (voto nominal) and proportional representation (voto listo). For these elections, 110 representatives were elected nominally and 52 were elected by party or proportion representation, with the final three going to indigenous legislators, for a total of 165.
The opposition accused the government of redrawing electoral districts favoring rural areas, which are strongholds of the PSUV, and under-representing urban centers where, supposedly, the opposition's base is concentrated. The CNE has acknowledged that "the system has the potential for a degree of disproportional representation" but the reality is that all political parties benefit from it from time to time and in these elections it seems that the opposition benefited the most.(4)
A case in point is the fact that the PSUV received at least 40% of the votes in the states of Zulia, Anzoategui, Nueva Esparta, and Tachira, yet they only received 7 parliamentary seats while the opposition obtained 27 seats. In Zulia, with its heavy populated urban centers, PSUV received only 156,376 votes fewer than the opposition. Yet the PUSV only received 3 seats in parliament, as against the opposition's 12 seats.
By looking at the results for each party individually and their representation in parliament, the picture becomes clear; the PSUV is only party that has massive support. On its own the PSUV won 58% of the seats in parliament with their closest rival, the Democratic Action (AD), taking merely 13% of the seats. No one party has anywhere close to the level of popular support at the national level that the PSUV has. In addition, the PSUV won the majority of the seats in 16 of Venezuela's 23 states.
With such a close margin between the PSUV and the opposition, can Chavez really claim victory? To answer this we need to put it into context and analyze the forces behind the opposition. For these elections, the opposition ("MUD" as they are known by their Spanish acronym) did a great job of combining all the forces of the right into one. Together this right-wing coalition is made up of more than 50 parties with various ideological allegiances. Some parties are only regional and others emerged simply for the elections. One can say the opposition employed the strategy of splitting votes across multiple opposition forces presenting the appearance of popular support. It's hard to envision how this opposition is going to function as a unified block in parliament, let alone present a real opposition to the PSUV.
Even "united," this massive block of opposition failed to achieve an electoral victory. There platform was not solution-based but rather focused on anti-"Chavismo." Their key weapon, as always, was fear, and for that voters punished them.
Biased media coverage
Another baseless claim from the opposition during the election was that the media is controlled and dominated by Chavez. These elections once again showed these claims to be without foundation. The CNE looked at the coverage of both parties on TV and their results were revealing. In paid television advertising slots between July 12 and September 21, 53% were placed by the opposition, while 39% were pro-PSUV, and the rest went to other political parties. In a second study of the two major state-owned television stations and the four private stations, 60.3% of political television advertising was pro-opposition.(5)
PSUV lacks a two-thirds majority in Parliament
Many claim that the PSUV failure to obtain a two-thirds majority in parliament is a major obstacle to Chavez in continuing the process of socialist transformation. In fact, the two-thirds margin is significant for presidential decrees, but its importance as a tool for deepening reform has been greatly exaggerated. Ninety-nine percent of laws are passed by simple majority. The major challenge to internal reform comes from within the party and society itself. If we look at the pace at which reforms have been adopted over the past few years, we see they are limited more by administrative capacity and bureaucracy than legislative. The Financial Times recently added up the value of industries nationalized by the Chavez government over the five years. Outside oil, it came to less than 8% of GDP.(6)
Challenges before the PSUV
Venezuela still has a long way to go before the state is in control of the economy. However, the immediate challenge lies in consolidating what has already been nationalized. Examples of this can be seen in Puerto Ordaz, in state of Bolivar, were this year NorPro, the bauxite processing plant de Venezuela was nationalization.
This factory is a great example of "co-management" -- a "socialist enterprise where workers have taken control and are in the process of transforming the company. However after six months under workers' control the plant struggles to start any production and its machines sit idle.
CVG Aluminio del Caroni,S.A. (ALCASA), an aluminum producing company in the state of Bolivar that was nationalized back 2005. Here workers have been running the plant for several years. Today the plant is losing significant amounts of revenue a year, due to the challenges facing the aluminum industry in the face of global recession. The challenge for them is how to retool the company so they are not just producing raw material for export to feed the capitalist market but rather producing products for their local market. The development of their downstream industry is hampered more by state bureaucracy than by legislative barriers.
The real struggle for participatory democracy in Venezuela does not lie with the traditional establishments of power, but rather lies at the grassroots level where many sectors of society are taking control of their communities. But it's precisely on the streets of Caracas that one is starting to hear dissatisfaction with aspects of nepotism and bureaucracy taking root in the PSUV. Corrupt professional politicians seeping into the ranks of the Bolivarian movement arouse indignation in the PSUV ranks.
The PSUV needs to guard against this and continue to focus on building popular power in the streets, barrios, and rural communities, which has taken form as communal councils and people's cooperatives. Under Chavez these forms of participatory democracy have flourished across the country. Only by energizing and nourishing popular power will Venezuelans see a true transformation of their society to a more egalitarian one based on socialist values.
_____________________________________
(1) http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0923_venezuela_elections_cardenas.aspx
(2) http://www.chavezcode.com/2010/09/us-interference-in-venezuelan-elections.html
(3) http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5623
(4) http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/5674
(5) http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_61215.shtml
(6) http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/sep/27/venezuela-election-opposition-politics
Good News for Venezuela's Socialist and Pro-Chavez Forces
A New Opportunity for Venezuela's Socialists
by Gregory Wilpert
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5683
The good news for Venezuela's socialist and pro-Chavez forces is that while the September 26 National Assembly election might seem to be a disappointing result, because Chavez's party won only about 50% of the popular vote, it is actually quite impressive. That is, after nearly 12 years in government and after two particularly bad years, in which the economy shrank, in which there were numerous blackouts due to a severe drought and a lack of hydroelectric power, in which crime seemed to reach new highs, and in which government mismanagement caused tens of thousands of tons of food to rot, it is actually rather impressive that about 50% of the population would vote for Chavez's party. This represents a new opportunity for the governing socialists to learn from past errors and to move forward in their program to construct 21st century socialism.
On a district-by-district basis, this result translated into giving Venezuela's governing party, the PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela), 98 seats in the National Assembly (AN), to the 65 seats of the opposition coalition MUD (Table of Democratic Unity) (with two going to the independent party PPT). The opposition thus achieved its goal of preventing a two-thirds majority for the PSUV. Thus, given their near complete absence in the previous AN, this result also represents a comeback for the once moribund opposition.
Why "only" 49% of the vote and 59% of the legislators?
Chavez's critics now argue that the PSUV's new 59% majority in the National Assembly, which is 9 points higher than its popular vote, is proof of an unfair electoral system. In particular, they point to a new electoral suffrage law that was passed in 2009, which weakened the previously existing proportional representation system. The change is a bit complicated, but given that this has become a major issue in the international media, it is worth explaining.
First of all, Venezuela has a mixed voting system, which gives 30% or 52 out of 165 seats in the National Assembly to statewide proportional party representation and the other 113 seats to directly elected electoral district representatives. Voters thus have two types of votes, one for a state party list of candidates and another for one to three individual electoral district representatives (the number of district representatives depends on the size of the district). For the 2000 and 2005 national assembly elections the electoral law stipulated that the statewide party list vote (Venezuela has 26 federal states) should be considered in conjunction with the direct candidate votes, so that if a party wins a direct representative in that state, it would receive one less representative via the party list.[1] This system, which is modeled on Germany's, guarantees that small parties could be represented in the legislature even if they did not win any directly elected district representatives, as long as they got over a certain percentage of the statewide party list vote.
However, already in 2000, an opposition governor of Yaracuy state discovered that if you set up two different parties that are in alliance and have one of the parties run only on the direct vote part of the ballot and the other only on the proportional vote of the ballot, then this alliance can significantly increase its number of representatives, if these parties are likely to receive a larger proportion of the vote than any other party.[2] In effect, a way was found to game the system that favors a dominant party or alliance. In 2005 Chavez's governing party, the MVR picked up this trick and created a new allied party, the UVE, which ran only on the proportional part of the ballot, while the MVR ran only on the direct part. Subsequently, the Supreme Court denied a constitutional challenge to the practice, saying that since the constitution does not specify the method for proportional representation, parties cannot be prohibited from forming this type of alliance.[3] In the end, the opposition boycotted the 2005 National Assembly election and the issue became moot, since Chavez's supporters won 100% of the National Assembly representatives.
In 2009 the National Assembly passed a new electoral suffrage law, which eliminated the provision that previously had caused direct representatives to count against the proportional representatives a party could have won.[4] In short, the direct vote and the proportional vote would be counted separately and the winning candidates adjudicated separately. This made the trick of running two allied parties unnecessary. Also, the new law lowered the number of proportional representatives from 40% of the National Assembly to 30%. As a result, proportional representation in the National Assembly was reduced significantly and now mainly guarantees that an opposition party that does not win candidates via the direct representative vote, may at least win a few proportional representatives.
In the case of the Sept 26 vote, if it were not for the proportional part of the ballot, the opposition would have won 33% of the Assembly, instead of 39%. However, if the old electoral suffrage law had been in effect on Sept. 26, the opposition would have won 45% of the seats, 6 percentage points or 10 seats more. Given that this would not have changed the PSUV's absolute majority in the Assembly, this would not have made a significant difference.
Perhaps more importantly, though, is the implication that Venezuela's electoral system is somehow "rigged" against the opposition. The fact is, Venezuela's legislature (even before the 1999 constitution) has always slightly over-represented rural areas, so as to ensure that these areas would not be completely dominated by the more populous urban interests. It just happens to be the case that Chavez is far more popular in rural electoral districts than in urban ones. It is perfectly legitimate to debate whether such an overrepresentation is wrong, but one must keep in mind that this is not an invention of the Chavez government.
Also, it is quite possible that if party A has particularly many voters in a few districts and party B has its voters more evenly divided throughout the country, but always outnumbering its rival party, then B will end up winning far more districts than A, even though their national level of support is more or less the same. For example, this is what happens quite often in Britain, where the Labour Party won 55% of the seats in 2005 with only 37% of the vote. In such a system it is even theoretically possible to have a minority of the popular vote and still win a majority of the seats.
As for the accusation that electoral districts have been changed to give the PSUV more votes, even opposition supporters argue that these changes have been minimal.[5] Certainly they have not come even close to the gerrymandering seen in some congressional districts in the U.S.[6]
Unfair Media Advantage?
Another common accusation against the Chavez government has been that it has an unfair media advantage because the government controls more and more media outlets. Indeed, many new state-run or state-funded media outlets have been created in the past few years, such as Telesur, National Assembly TV (ANTV), Avila TV, Vive, and Tves. However, even combined, their audience share does not come close to that of the private TV stations. For example, in the battle for news and politics viewers, the private hard-line opposition-oriented Globovision usually reaches twice the audience share as the state-run VTV during prime time.[7]
Also, judging from the persistent slew of insults and vitriol that Teodoro Petkoff and Marta Colomina (perhaps the two most prominent opposition commentators, in print and in radio, respectively), among many others, continue to launch against Chavez every day, it would seem that none of the recent high-profile corruption accusations against opposition-oriented business people had an effect on freedom of speech in Venezuela.
The Power of the National Assembly
It should thus come as no surprise that in a year in which the government was facing multiple crises (economic, electric, crime, and mismanagement of state food distribution) that the oppositional media would be able to run with these issues and make important inroads into Chavez's popularity. Polls in early 2010 showed Chavez's popularity dropping from a high of nearly 70% in May, 2008,[8] to perhaps just under 50% in early 2010. However, as the economy gradually recovered in the in mid 2010, Chavez's popularity recovered too. Another reason for this increase in popularity was that Chavez went into full campaign mode and started inaugurating new industrial centers, health centers, and new social programs (such as a new credit card called, "Buen Vivir" -- good living).
The reason that Chavez made such an all-out effort is that Venezuela's National Assembly is more important and powerful than most people realize, since most see in Venezuela a very presidentialist political system. The fact is, though, Venezuela's National Assembly is arguably more powerful than the U.S. Congress. Not only does the President not have the right to veto legislation, but the AN appoints all members to three of the other four branches of government: the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, the Comptroller General, the Human Rights Ombudsperson, and the National Electoral Council. Also, the AN has the power to dismiss Ministers and the Vice-President.
To complicate matters further, many laws (laws that set the framework for state institutions and for other laws, so-called "organic" laws) require a two-thirds majority, including many of the appointments to the other branches of government. This means that losing a two-thirds majority in the AN will cause a serious problem for the Chavez government, since it either cannot pass organic laws and make key appointments, or it will have to negotiate with the opposition. The more likely result, though, will be paralysis in such cases, which is what happened frequently during the 2000-2005 legislative period, when opposition and Chavista forces were nearly evenly matched in the AN.
Castro-Communism Versus Fascist Capitalism
The September 26 election cements the comeback of the opposition and reflects a temporary weakening of the Chavez government. Following a failed coup (2002), an oil industry shutdown (2003), and the boycott of the last AN elections (2005), the opposition is gradually reintegrating itself into Venezuelan political life, with its participation in the 2006 presidential election, in the 2008 regional election, and in this AN election. Also, with the formation of a new unified alliance (the MUD), the opposition appears to be more united than in the past. However, it still has to overcome some key obstacles if it is to become more effective in combating Chavez. For one, it would have to abstain from accepting money from foreign sources. According to a recent report opposition-affiliated groups have received tens of millions of dollars in the past year.[9]
Second, the opposition would have to become more democratic by holding primary elections for its candidates as well as elections for its party leaders. For the recent AN election the opposition held primaries in only 18% of the electoral districts, while the PSUV held primaries in all electoral districts.
As long as the Bolivarian Revolution is beginning to show signs of wearing out (such as in poorly executed social programs) and difficulties in overcoming key problems of the past year (particularly the economic crisis and crime), the opposition will have it easier. Still, in Venezuela's barrios and in the countryside people continue to feel loyalty to their "Commandante" Chavez. The land reform, the communal councils that give citizens more power in their communities, and the many social programs are highly valued in these sectors. Although many are frustrated that many day-to-day problems remain unresolved, by and large they do not turn to the opposition, which still largely consists of the country's tired old elite. They simply do not believe the opposition when it claims that Chavez is taking the country towards "Castro-Communism." On the other hand, it is doubtful that they believe Chavez's warning that the opposition represents capitalist fascism.
In other words, Venezuela is a country in which politics is extremely polarized but in which the population is not. According to opinion surveys a little over a third of the population consists of die-hard Chavez supporters and a little under a third consists of die-hard Chavez opponents. The third third tends to be undecided and is often considered to consist of "ni-nis" (neither with Chavez nor against Chavez). This is the part of the population that Chavez and the opposition must try to win over.
One party has now finally tried to capitalize on this segment of the population by rejecting both Chavez and the opposition. This party, the PPT (Fatherland for All), which for a long time supported Chavez, split from the pro-Chavez coalition earlier this year and attempted, with the help of the popular governor of Lara state, Henri Falcon, to constitute a third force in the country. In a surprise to many analysts, this effort appears to have ended in failure now, since the PPT picked up only two AN representatives and none in Lara. Apparently the PPT took votes mostly from the opposition, which would suggest that voter loyalty to Chavez is stronger than to the opposition. In effect, it seems that the public's non-polarization still does not carry over to the political sphere, especially since the winner-take-all voting system makes it more difficult for third parties.
Prospects
Despite the relatively equal vote count for the two remaining sides, the opposition is now claiming that this is the beginning of the end of Chavez. Indeed, this would seem plausible if one considers that Chavez enjoyed a high point of popularity in 2006, shortly after his reelection with 63% of the vote. On the other hand, Chavez has been declared politically dead before only to reemerge stronger, such as after 2002/2003, after the coup attempt and the oil industry shutdown. Much can still happen in the next two years until the next presidential election in 2012, for which Chavez has already announced his candidacy.
Chavez's main program for the time until the next election is to continue the effort to establish "21st century socialism" in Venezuela. Exactly what this means is still not entirely clear, but there are a few indications. Towards the top of the agenda is a new labor law, which could democratize not only state-owned enterprises, but private enterprises too, via workers' councils. Also, the role of communal councils is to be strengthened, particularly on the citywide and perhaps even statewide and national levels. With regard to the economy the government intends to expand its industrial planning effort and to support strategic private industries so that the country becomes less dependent on oil export earnings.
These efforts, however, will be complicated due to the PSUV's loss of its two-thirds majority in the AN. The real danger, though, is that Chavez and his supporters will interpret their 59% AN majority as an undisputed triumph and that they will forget, as a result, that barely 50% of Venezuelans voted for the PSUV. The governing party might thereby fail to reflect on the reasons for this rather narrow victory and miss a crucial opportunity to address these reasons.
Many in Venezuela, both in the opposition and in the more moderate wing of the PSUV are trying to convince Chavez that the reason for the narrow loss is due to his too radical approach and that he needs to "slow down" and "moderate". There is little indication, though, that this is the reason Chavez's popularity has suffered in the past year.
Rather, the reasons are to be found with basic problems, such as unemployment, insecurity, and poor government services. This is what most surveys and casual conversations in the barrios indicate. Also, given that most Venezuelans (especially the poor) have so far reacted positively to Chavez's larger program of deepening the democratization of the economy, of the media, and of the polity, there is every reason to believe that they will continue to support him if he follows this program. If Chavez and his supporters decisively address the basic issues as well as the strategic programmatic ones, then[10] Chavez has an excellent chance of being reelected in 2012 and thereby reversing the opposition's recent comeback.
Notes
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[1] For example, if a state has 10 direct representatives and 3 party list representatives and party A wins 6 of the direct representatives and 60% of the party list vote, then it would get no party list candidates for that state because its direct representatives count against the 2 party list representatives it could have in the proportional vote. The 3 party list representatives would then go to the next party that did not win a sufficient number of direct representatives to fill its quota of proportional representatives.
[2] The reason for this is that if one of those parties wins a representative on the direct portion of the ballot, there are no representatives on the proportional part of the ballot that it could lose due to this win. Instead, the proportional representatives of the allied party get all of the seats that they are due to receive since they have no direct candidates.
[3] See: "Venezuela's Supreme Court Rejects Challenge to December Vote" by Gregory Wilpert, October 29, 2005 in Venezuelanalysis.com (http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/1441 [4])
[4] See: "Venezuela Passes New Electoral Law," by Tamara Pearson, August 3, 2009 in Venezuelanalysis.com (http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/4681 [5])
[5] For example, the opposition blogger Francisco Toro of Caracas Chronicles wrote back in February 2010, "To my mind, what's interesting is that CNE wasn't really as aggressive as they might have been. If they'd really put their minds to it - if, say, they'd carved up crazy circuits that cross state lines or split parroquias in two - they could've done much better...by which I mean much, much worse."
(http://www.caracaschronicles.com/node/2302 [6])
[6] See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerrymandering [7]
[7] In March, 2010, at 9pm, Globovision had 1.29 audience share and VTV had 0.68. See: http://profanoymundano.obolog.com/rating-venezuela-ultimas-mediciones-in... [8]
[8] "Chavez Approval Rating 68.8%, Recent Venezuelan Poll Shows," by James Suggett, May 13, 2008, Venezuelanalysis.com (http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/3438 [9])
[9] See: "U.S. Interference in Venezuelan Elections," by Eva Golinger, September 10, 2010 (http://www.chavezcode.com/2010/09/us-interference-in-venezuelan-election... [10])
by Gregory Wilpert
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/5683
The good news for Venezuela's socialist and pro-Chavez forces is that while the September 26 National Assembly election might seem to be a disappointing result, because Chavez's party won only about 50% of the popular vote, it is actually quite impressive. That is, after nearly 12 years in government and after two particularly bad years, in which the economy shrank, in which there were numerous blackouts due to a severe drought and a lack of hydroelectric power, in which crime seemed to reach new highs, and in which government mismanagement caused tens of thousands of tons of food to rot, it is actually rather impressive that about 50% of the population would vote for Chavez's party. This represents a new opportunity for the governing socialists to learn from past errors and to move forward in their program to construct 21st century socialism.
On a district-by-district basis, this result translated into giving Venezuela's governing party, the PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela), 98 seats in the National Assembly (AN), to the 65 seats of the opposition coalition MUD (Table of Democratic Unity) (with two going to the independent party PPT). The opposition thus achieved its goal of preventing a two-thirds majority for the PSUV. Thus, given their near complete absence in the previous AN, this result also represents a comeback for the once moribund opposition.
Why "only" 49% of the vote and 59% of the legislators?
Chavez's critics now argue that the PSUV's new 59% majority in the National Assembly, which is 9 points higher than its popular vote, is proof of an unfair electoral system. In particular, they point to a new electoral suffrage law that was passed in 2009, which weakened the previously existing proportional representation system. The change is a bit complicated, but given that this has become a major issue in the international media, it is worth explaining.
First of all, Venezuela has a mixed voting system, which gives 30% or 52 out of 165 seats in the National Assembly to statewide proportional party representation and the other 113 seats to directly elected electoral district representatives. Voters thus have two types of votes, one for a state party list of candidates and another for one to three individual electoral district representatives (the number of district representatives depends on the size of the district). For the 2000 and 2005 national assembly elections the electoral law stipulated that the statewide party list vote (Venezuela has 26 federal states) should be considered in conjunction with the direct candidate votes, so that if a party wins a direct representative in that state, it would receive one less representative via the party list.[1] This system, which is modeled on Germany's, guarantees that small parties could be represented in the legislature even if they did not win any directly elected district representatives, as long as they got over a certain percentage of the statewide party list vote.
However, already in 2000, an opposition governor of Yaracuy state discovered that if you set up two different parties that are in alliance and have one of the parties run only on the direct vote part of the ballot and the other only on the proportional vote of the ballot, then this alliance can significantly increase its number of representatives, if these parties are likely to receive a larger proportion of the vote than any other party.[2] In effect, a way was found to game the system that favors a dominant party or alliance. In 2005 Chavez's governing party, the MVR picked up this trick and created a new allied party, the UVE, which ran only on the proportional part of the ballot, while the MVR ran only on the direct part. Subsequently, the Supreme Court denied a constitutional challenge to the practice, saying that since the constitution does not specify the method for proportional representation, parties cannot be prohibited from forming this type of alliance.[3] In the end, the opposition boycotted the 2005 National Assembly election and the issue became moot, since Chavez's supporters won 100% of the National Assembly representatives.
In 2009 the National Assembly passed a new electoral suffrage law, which eliminated the provision that previously had caused direct representatives to count against the proportional representatives a party could have won.[4] In short, the direct vote and the proportional vote would be counted separately and the winning candidates adjudicated separately. This made the trick of running two allied parties unnecessary. Also, the new law lowered the number of proportional representatives from 40% of the National Assembly to 30%. As a result, proportional representation in the National Assembly was reduced significantly and now mainly guarantees that an opposition party that does not win candidates via the direct representative vote, may at least win a few proportional representatives.
In the case of the Sept 26 vote, if it were not for the proportional part of the ballot, the opposition would have won 33% of the Assembly, instead of 39%. However, if the old electoral suffrage law had been in effect on Sept. 26, the opposition would have won 45% of the seats, 6 percentage points or 10 seats more. Given that this would not have changed the PSUV's absolute majority in the Assembly, this would not have made a significant difference.
Perhaps more importantly, though, is the implication that Venezuela's electoral system is somehow "rigged" against the opposition. The fact is, Venezuela's legislature (even before the 1999 constitution) has always slightly over-represented rural areas, so as to ensure that these areas would not be completely dominated by the more populous urban interests. It just happens to be the case that Chavez is far more popular in rural electoral districts than in urban ones. It is perfectly legitimate to debate whether such an overrepresentation is wrong, but one must keep in mind that this is not an invention of the Chavez government.
Also, it is quite possible that if party A has particularly many voters in a few districts and party B has its voters more evenly divided throughout the country, but always outnumbering its rival party, then B will end up winning far more districts than A, even though their national level of support is more or less the same. For example, this is what happens quite often in Britain, where the Labour Party won 55% of the seats in 2005 with only 37% of the vote. In such a system it is even theoretically possible to have a minority of the popular vote and still win a majority of the seats.
As for the accusation that electoral districts have been changed to give the PSUV more votes, even opposition supporters argue that these changes have been minimal.[5] Certainly they have not come even close to the gerrymandering seen in some congressional districts in the U.S.[6]
Unfair Media Advantage?
Another common accusation against the Chavez government has been that it has an unfair media advantage because the government controls more and more media outlets. Indeed, many new state-run or state-funded media outlets have been created in the past few years, such as Telesur, National Assembly TV (ANTV), Avila TV, Vive, and Tves. However, even combined, their audience share does not come close to that of the private TV stations. For example, in the battle for news and politics viewers, the private hard-line opposition-oriented Globovision usually reaches twice the audience share as the state-run VTV during prime time.[7]
Also, judging from the persistent slew of insults and vitriol that Teodoro Petkoff and Marta Colomina (perhaps the two most prominent opposition commentators, in print and in radio, respectively), among many others, continue to launch against Chavez every day, it would seem that none of the recent high-profile corruption accusations against opposition-oriented business people had an effect on freedom of speech in Venezuela.
The Power of the National Assembly
It should thus come as no surprise that in a year in which the government was facing multiple crises (economic, electric, crime, and mismanagement of state food distribution) that the oppositional media would be able to run with these issues and make important inroads into Chavez's popularity. Polls in early 2010 showed Chavez's popularity dropping from a high of nearly 70% in May, 2008,[8] to perhaps just under 50% in early 2010. However, as the economy gradually recovered in the in mid 2010, Chavez's popularity recovered too. Another reason for this increase in popularity was that Chavez went into full campaign mode and started inaugurating new industrial centers, health centers, and new social programs (such as a new credit card called, "Buen Vivir" -- good living).
The reason that Chavez made such an all-out effort is that Venezuela's National Assembly is more important and powerful than most people realize, since most see in Venezuela a very presidentialist political system. The fact is, though, Venezuela's National Assembly is arguably more powerful than the U.S. Congress. Not only does the President not have the right to veto legislation, but the AN appoints all members to three of the other four branches of government: the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, the Comptroller General, the Human Rights Ombudsperson, and the National Electoral Council. Also, the AN has the power to dismiss Ministers and the Vice-President.
To complicate matters further, many laws (laws that set the framework for state institutions and for other laws, so-called "organic" laws) require a two-thirds majority, including many of the appointments to the other branches of government. This means that losing a two-thirds majority in the AN will cause a serious problem for the Chavez government, since it either cannot pass organic laws and make key appointments, or it will have to negotiate with the opposition. The more likely result, though, will be paralysis in such cases, which is what happened frequently during the 2000-2005 legislative period, when opposition and Chavista forces were nearly evenly matched in the AN.
Castro-Communism Versus Fascist Capitalism
The September 26 election cements the comeback of the opposition and reflects a temporary weakening of the Chavez government. Following a failed coup (2002), an oil industry shutdown (2003), and the boycott of the last AN elections (2005), the opposition is gradually reintegrating itself into Venezuelan political life, with its participation in the 2006 presidential election, in the 2008 regional election, and in this AN election. Also, with the formation of a new unified alliance (the MUD), the opposition appears to be more united than in the past. However, it still has to overcome some key obstacles if it is to become more effective in combating Chavez. For one, it would have to abstain from accepting money from foreign sources. According to a recent report opposition-affiliated groups have received tens of millions of dollars in the past year.[9]
Second, the opposition would have to become more democratic by holding primary elections for its candidates as well as elections for its party leaders. For the recent AN election the opposition held primaries in only 18% of the electoral districts, while the PSUV held primaries in all electoral districts.
As long as the Bolivarian Revolution is beginning to show signs of wearing out (such as in poorly executed social programs) and difficulties in overcoming key problems of the past year (particularly the economic crisis and crime), the opposition will have it easier. Still, in Venezuela's barrios and in the countryside people continue to feel loyalty to their "Commandante" Chavez. The land reform, the communal councils that give citizens more power in their communities, and the many social programs are highly valued in these sectors. Although many are frustrated that many day-to-day problems remain unresolved, by and large they do not turn to the opposition, which still largely consists of the country's tired old elite. They simply do not believe the opposition when it claims that Chavez is taking the country towards "Castro-Communism." On the other hand, it is doubtful that they believe Chavez's warning that the opposition represents capitalist fascism.
In other words, Venezuela is a country in which politics is extremely polarized but in which the population is not. According to opinion surveys a little over a third of the population consists of die-hard Chavez supporters and a little under a third consists of die-hard Chavez opponents. The third third tends to be undecided and is often considered to consist of "ni-nis" (neither with Chavez nor against Chavez). This is the part of the population that Chavez and the opposition must try to win over.
One party has now finally tried to capitalize on this segment of the population by rejecting both Chavez and the opposition. This party, the PPT (Fatherland for All), which for a long time supported Chavez, split from the pro-Chavez coalition earlier this year and attempted, with the help of the popular governor of Lara state, Henri Falcon, to constitute a third force in the country. In a surprise to many analysts, this effort appears to have ended in failure now, since the PPT picked up only two AN representatives and none in Lara. Apparently the PPT took votes mostly from the opposition, which would suggest that voter loyalty to Chavez is stronger than to the opposition. In effect, it seems that the public's non-polarization still does not carry over to the political sphere, especially since the winner-take-all voting system makes it more difficult for third parties.
Prospects
Despite the relatively equal vote count for the two remaining sides, the opposition is now claiming that this is the beginning of the end of Chavez. Indeed, this would seem plausible if one considers that Chavez enjoyed a high point of popularity in 2006, shortly after his reelection with 63% of the vote. On the other hand, Chavez has been declared politically dead before only to reemerge stronger, such as after 2002/2003, after the coup attempt and the oil industry shutdown. Much can still happen in the next two years until the next presidential election in 2012, for which Chavez has already announced his candidacy.
Chavez's main program for the time until the next election is to continue the effort to establish "21st century socialism" in Venezuela. Exactly what this means is still not entirely clear, but there are a few indications. Towards the top of the agenda is a new labor law, which could democratize not only state-owned enterprises, but private enterprises too, via workers' councils. Also, the role of communal councils is to be strengthened, particularly on the citywide and perhaps even statewide and national levels. With regard to the economy the government intends to expand its industrial planning effort and to support strategic private industries so that the country becomes less dependent on oil export earnings.
These efforts, however, will be complicated due to the PSUV's loss of its two-thirds majority in the AN. The real danger, though, is that Chavez and his supporters will interpret their 59% AN majority as an undisputed triumph and that they will forget, as a result, that barely 50% of Venezuelans voted for the PSUV. The governing party might thereby fail to reflect on the reasons for this rather narrow victory and miss a crucial opportunity to address these reasons.
Many in Venezuela, both in the opposition and in the more moderate wing of the PSUV are trying to convince Chavez that the reason for the narrow loss is due to his too radical approach and that he needs to "slow down" and "moderate". There is little indication, though, that this is the reason Chavez's popularity has suffered in the past year.
Rather, the reasons are to be found with basic problems, such as unemployment, insecurity, and poor government services. This is what most surveys and casual conversations in the barrios indicate. Also, given that most Venezuelans (especially the poor) have so far reacted positively to Chavez's larger program of deepening the democratization of the economy, of the media, and of the polity, there is every reason to believe that they will continue to support him if he follows this program. If Chavez and his supporters decisively address the basic issues as well as the strategic programmatic ones, then[10] Chavez has an excellent chance of being reelected in 2012 and thereby reversing the opposition's recent comeback.
Notes
______________________________________
[1] For example, if a state has 10 direct representatives and 3 party list representatives and party A wins 6 of the direct representatives and 60% of the party list vote, then it would get no party list candidates for that state because its direct representatives count against the 2 party list representatives it could have in the proportional vote. The 3 party list representatives would then go to the next party that did not win a sufficient number of direct representatives to fill its quota of proportional representatives.
[2] The reason for this is that if one of those parties wins a representative on the direct portion of the ballot, there are no representatives on the proportional part of the ballot that it could lose due to this win. Instead, the proportional representatives of the allied party get all of the seats that they are due to receive since they have no direct candidates.
[3] See: "Venezuela's Supreme Court Rejects Challenge to December Vote" by Gregory Wilpert, October 29, 2005 in Venezuelanalysis.com (http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/1441 [4])
[4] See: "Venezuela Passes New Electoral Law," by Tamara Pearson, August 3, 2009 in Venezuelanalysis.com (http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/4681 [5])
[5] For example, the opposition blogger Francisco Toro of Caracas Chronicles wrote back in February 2010, "To my mind, what's interesting is that CNE wasn't really as aggressive as they might have been. If they'd really put their minds to it - if, say, they'd carved up crazy circuits that cross state lines or split parroquias in two - they could've done much better...by which I mean much, much worse."
(http://www.caracaschronicles.com/node/2302 [6])
[6] See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerrymandering [7]
[7] In March, 2010, at 9pm, Globovision had 1.29 audience share and VTV had 0.68. See: http://profanoymundano.obolog.com/rating-venezuela-ultimas-mediciones-in... [8]
[8] "Chavez Approval Rating 68.8%, Recent Venezuelan Poll Shows," by James Suggett, May 13, 2008, Venezuelanalysis.com (http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/3438 [9])
[9] See: "U.S. Interference in Venezuelan Elections," by Eva Golinger, September 10, 2010 (http://www.chavezcode.com/2010/09/us-interference-in-venezuelan-election... [10])
Media News best from Web
Dear Friends,
Here's a very good, compact analysis of world media lies regarding Venezuela's economy. As Mark says, for accurate information, look on the web. Mark's own website is www.cepr.org. Also, be sure to check out www.venezuelanalysis.com.
Misreporting Venezuela's economywww.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/sep/10/venezuela-economics
By Mark Weisbrot
If you want a perfect illustration of media toeing the official line, look no further than the forecasts of Venezuela's economic doom
Subsidised markets that provide cheap staples, such as milk, rice, corn and sugar are now reported to have shortages. Photograph: Juan Barreto/AFP
The bulk of the media often gets pulled along for the ride when the United States government has a serious political and public relations campaign around foreign policy. But almost nowhere is it so monolithic as with Venezuela. Even in the runup to the Iraq war, there were a significant number of reporters and editorial writers who didn't buy the official story. But on Venezuela, the media is more like a jury that has 12 people but only one brain.
Since the Venezuelan opposition decided to campaign for the September elections on the issue of Venezuela's high homicide rate, the international press has been flooded with stories on this theme – some of them highly exaggerated. This is actually quite an amazing public relations achievement for the Venezuelan opposition. Although most of the Venezuelan media, as measured by audience, is still owned by the political opposition there, the international press is not. Normally, it takes some kind of news hook, even if only a milestone such as the 10,000th murder, or a political statement from the White House, for a media campaign of this magnitude to take off. But in this case, all it took was a decision by the Venezuelan political opposition that homicide would be its main campaign issue, and the international press was all over it.
The "all bad news, all the time" theme was overwhelmingly dominant even during Venezuela's record economic expansion, from 2003 to 2008. The economy grew as never before, poverty was cut by more than half, and there were large gains in employment. Real social spending per person more than tripled, and free healthcare was expanded to millions of people. You will have to search very hard to find these basic facts presented in a mainstream media article, although the numbers are hardly in dispute among economists in international organisations that deal with statistics.
For example, in May, the UN Commission on Latin America (ECLAC) found that Venezuela had reduced inequality by more than any other country in Latin America from 2002 to 2008, ending up with the most equal income distribution in the region. This has yet to be mentioned by the major international press.
Venezuela went into recession in 2009, and you can imagine how much more press attention has since been paid to GDP growth there than when Venezuela was growing faster than any economy in the hemisphere. Then, in January, the government devalued its currency, and the press was forecasting a big upsurge in inflation, to as much as 60 percent for this year. "stagflation" – recession plus rising inflation – became the new buzzword.
The "out-of-control" inflation didn't happen – in fact, inflation over the last three months, which is 21% at annualised rate, is considerably lower than before the devaluation. This is yet another indicator that the economists relied upon by major media as sources have limited understanding of the actual functioning of Venezuela's economy.
Now, it looks as though Venezuela may have emerged from its recession in the second quarter of this year. On a seasonally adjusted annualised basis, the economy grew by 5.2% in the second quarter. In June, Morgan Stanley projected that the economy would shrink by 6.2% this year and by 1.2% next year. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is projecting long-term gloom and doom for Venezuela: negative per capita GDP growth over the next five years. It is worth noting that the IMF gave the authors of "Dow 36,000" some competition for creative forecasting, with their repeated, wildly off-the-mark underestimates of the Venezuelan economy during the expansion.
All this may seem like par for the course if we compare it with coverage of the world's largest economy, the United States, where the vast majority of the media somehow missed the two biggest asset bubbles in world history – the stockmarket and then the housing bubble. But there were important exceptions here (for example,. the New York Times in 2006). With Venezuela – well, you get the picture.
Of course, Venezuela's continued growth is not assured; it will depend on the government making a commitment to maintaining high levels of aggregate demand, and keeping it. In that sense, its immediate situation is similar to that of the United States, the Eurozone and many other more developed economies, whose economic recovery is sluggish and uncertain right now.
Venezuela has adequate foreign exchange reserves, is running a trade and current account surplus, has low levels of foreign public debt and quite a bit of foreign borrowing capacity, if needed. This was demonstrated most recently in April with a $20bn (about 6% of Venezuela's GDP) credit from China. As such, it is extremely unlikely to run up against a foreign exchange shortage. It can therefore use public spending and investment as much as necessary to make sure that the economy grows sufficiently to increase employment and living standards, as it did before the 2009 recession. (Our government in the United States could do the same, even more easily –but that does not appear to be in the cards right now.) This can go on for many years.
Whatever happens, we can expect complete coverage of one side of the story from the media. So keep it in mind: even when you are reading the New York Times or listening to NPR on Venezuela, you are getting Fox News. If you want something more balanced, you will have to look for it on the web.
Here's a very good, compact analysis of world media lies regarding Venezuela's economy. As Mark says, for accurate information, look on the web. Mark's own website is www.cepr.org. Also, be sure to check out www.venezuelanalysis.com.
Misreporting Venezuela's economywww.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/sep/10/venezuela-economics
By Mark Weisbrot
If you want a perfect illustration of media toeing the official line, look no further than the forecasts of Venezuela's economic doom
Subsidised markets that provide cheap staples, such as milk, rice, corn and sugar are now reported to have shortages. Photograph: Juan Barreto/AFP
The bulk of the media often gets pulled along for the ride when the United States government has a serious political and public relations campaign around foreign policy. But almost nowhere is it so monolithic as with Venezuela. Even in the runup to the Iraq war, there were a significant number of reporters and editorial writers who didn't buy the official story. But on Venezuela, the media is more like a jury that has 12 people but only one brain.
Since the Venezuelan opposition decided to campaign for the September elections on the issue of Venezuela's high homicide rate, the international press has been flooded with stories on this theme – some of them highly exaggerated. This is actually quite an amazing public relations achievement for the Venezuelan opposition. Although most of the Venezuelan media, as measured by audience, is still owned by the political opposition there, the international press is not. Normally, it takes some kind of news hook, even if only a milestone such as the 10,000th murder, or a political statement from the White House, for a media campaign of this magnitude to take off. But in this case, all it took was a decision by the Venezuelan political opposition that homicide would be its main campaign issue, and the international press was all over it.
The "all bad news, all the time" theme was overwhelmingly dominant even during Venezuela's record economic expansion, from 2003 to 2008. The economy grew as never before, poverty was cut by more than half, and there were large gains in employment. Real social spending per person more than tripled, and free healthcare was expanded to millions of people. You will have to search very hard to find these basic facts presented in a mainstream media article, although the numbers are hardly in dispute among economists in international organisations that deal with statistics.
For example, in May, the UN Commission on Latin America (ECLAC) found that Venezuela had reduced inequality by more than any other country in Latin America from 2002 to 2008, ending up with the most equal income distribution in the region. This has yet to be mentioned by the major international press.
Venezuela went into recession in 2009, and you can imagine how much more press attention has since been paid to GDP growth there than when Venezuela was growing faster than any economy in the hemisphere. Then, in January, the government devalued its currency, and the press was forecasting a big upsurge in inflation, to as much as 60 percent for this year. "stagflation" – recession plus rising inflation – became the new buzzword.
The "out-of-control" inflation didn't happen – in fact, inflation over the last three months, which is 21% at annualised rate, is considerably lower than before the devaluation. This is yet another indicator that the economists relied upon by major media as sources have limited understanding of the actual functioning of Venezuela's economy.
Now, it looks as though Venezuela may have emerged from its recession in the second quarter of this year. On a seasonally adjusted annualised basis, the economy grew by 5.2% in the second quarter. In June, Morgan Stanley projected that the economy would shrink by 6.2% this year and by 1.2% next year. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is projecting long-term gloom and doom for Venezuela: negative per capita GDP growth over the next five years. It is worth noting that the IMF gave the authors of "Dow 36,000" some competition for creative forecasting, with their repeated, wildly off-the-mark underestimates of the Venezuelan economy during the expansion.
All this may seem like par for the course if we compare it with coverage of the world's largest economy, the United States, where the vast majority of the media somehow missed the two biggest asset bubbles in world history – the stockmarket and then the housing bubble. But there were important exceptions here (for example,. the New York Times in 2006). With Venezuela – well, you get the picture.
Of course, Venezuela's continued growth is not assured; it will depend on the government making a commitment to maintaining high levels of aggregate demand, and keeping it. In that sense, its immediate situation is similar to that of the United States, the Eurozone and many other more developed economies, whose economic recovery is sluggish and uncertain right now.
Venezuela has adequate foreign exchange reserves, is running a trade and current account surplus, has low levels of foreign public debt and quite a bit of foreign borrowing capacity, if needed. This was demonstrated most recently in April with a $20bn (about 6% of Venezuela's GDP) credit from China. As such, it is extremely unlikely to run up against a foreign exchange shortage. It can therefore use public spending and investment as much as necessary to make sure that the economy grows sufficiently to increase employment and living standards, as it did before the 2009 recession. (Our government in the United States could do the same, even more easily –but that does not appear to be in the cards right now.) This can go on for many years.
Whatever happens, we can expect complete coverage of one side of the story from the media. So keep it in mind: even when you are reading the New York Times or listening to NPR on Venezuela, you are getting Fox News. If you want something more balanced, you will have to look for it on the web.
Good for Venezuela, Australia, Canada
Venezuela: Land Reform, Food Sovereignty and Agro-Ecology
Urban food garden, Caracas.
By Alan Broughton
http://links.org.au/node/1855
August 20, 2010 -- A massive transformation of agriculture is occurring in Venezuela, a transformation that has lessons for every other country in the world. The Law of the Land and Agrarian Development, the Law of Food Sovereignty and Security and the Law of Integrated Agricultural Health set out the agenda (they can be found on www.mat.gob.ve, in Spanish). The policies are based on the premises that farmers should have control of their land and product, that the country should produce its own food, and that chemical fertilisers and pesticides should not be part of agriculture.
Land in Venezuela has been in the hands of about 500 families and corporations since the 1800s and worked by an impoverished peasantry. Much of the land was under utilised as cattle ranching, pulpwood plantations, export crops such as sugar cane, or left idle. Most food was imported. This land is gradually being taken over by the government and handed to local communities who have been fighting for it for two centuries.
Food sovereignty is a key government policy, guaranteed in the constitution: "Food sovereignty is the inalienable right of a nation to define and develop priorities and foods appropriate to its specific conditions, in local and national production, conserving agricultural and cultural diversity and self sufficiency and guaranteeing food supply to all the population." Food imports are only allowed if there is a shortfall of production in the country, and exports occur only after domestic demand is met.
Control over production is in the hands of farmers' cooperatives on the newly distributed lands. Assistance is provided by the government for cooperative management and to establish processing plants so the farmers are no longer victim to the power to set prices of the processors and distributors. Agriculture is planned, at three levels: the National Agrarian Assembly, the regional agrarian assemblies and the local peasants and producers councils. The regional assemblies are elected by the peasants and producers councils.
One goal is the elimination of chemical fertilisers and pesticides. Venezuela has had a long experience in their use and the change will be gradual. Agro-ecology colleges have been set up with the assistance of Cuban advisors, as Cuba went through this process 20 years ago and is now almost fully organic. Agro-ecology is promoted in all agricultural development projects, to producers and institutes.
I had the opportunity in July 2010 to visit Venezuela and see the changes that are taking place. Here are my impressions.
Urban agriculture -- Caracas
Venezuela is emulating the remarkable achievements of Cuba, where more than half of the fruit and vegetable needs of the urban population are produced within the cities. As in Cuba, the city food gardens are all organic, providing non-toxic safe fresh food to communities. The benefits of urban agriculture are seen as contributing to food security and sovereignty, improving the urban environment, supplementing the income of families, communities and schools, and fostering learning and recreational activities. The gardens are set up on unused land, at schools and, using raised beds, on concrete and balconies.
Community centres have established these gardens wherever possible. Some are in the very early stages and need more time and increased soil fertility to fully develop. One that I saw, on a former industrial site, was built on subsoil only six months ago, and was suffering the consequences, showing patchy growth and pest damage; a worm farm has been set up on that land to produce fertiliser to improve the hard soil. The community centres include a free health centre, usually a subsidised shop, a computer centre, adult education facilities and some even run a community radio.
An excellent example has been created in the median strip of a busy highway in Caracas by homeless people, former drug addicts, and is producing excellent crops. Marigolds are planted in each raised bed to provide habitat for beneficial insects, so that pests are no problem. Fertility is provided by a mixture of mountain soil and manure. When asked why the garden was unfenced, the spokesperson said that the usual local suspects for vandalism were already working on the project, so it needed no extra protection.
Cacao production and processing -- Barlovento region, Miranda State
Cacao growers, mostly descendents of former slaves brought from Africa, were until recently among the most impoverished people in the country, in a highly profitable industry. The cocoa beans were bought up cheaply by international corporations like Nestle by various means of price manipulation, and processed overseas. Now the producers are organised into cooperatives that have, with government assistance, set up factories for the primary processing into cocoa powder then into chocolate. The factories are managed by the producer's cooperative and the factory workers, who are from cacao growing families; decisions are made collectively. The price they receive has gone from 1 bolivar per kilo (about 15 cents) to 14 bolivares in three years and now provides them with a good standard of living. Still a large proportion of the beans are sold on the open market, but the government has set and enforces a minimum price that the commercial processors have to pay.
Fishing -- Chuao, Aragua State
Venezuela has the strongest fishing regulations in the world, and they are supported by the fishing people. Trawling has been phased out, fishing near reefs is prohibited, stunning devices like dynamite and poisons are not allowed, and nets cannot be left in the water -- they are just thrown out and hauled in. The size of the nets allows small fish to escape to breed or provide food for the larger fish. Sardine fishing is not done, as these are near the bottom of the food chain and needed for other fish. All fishers are organised into a local Fisher People's Council, and the National Council makes policy. The regulations are enforced by the government and the fishing people themselves, in order to provide long-term sustainable harvests. The fishing families now have education, health care, decent housing and retirement pensions, benefits they have never had before. National fish production has actually increased under these policies. The cooperatives run the cool stores and market the catch.
Field crops -- the plains states of Cojedes, Portuguesa and Yaracuy states
The central plain of Venezuela is the main food producing area, a region formerly totally dominated by huge estates. The land is gradually being redistributed to the communities that have worked the land for generations. Most of the people are Indigenous and were growing corn and beans long before the Spanish colonists arrived.
The communities that have gained control of the land have different methods of land ownership and organisation. Some communities chose to own individual plots and work together for machinery and knowledge sharing and marketing. Others form cooperatives of from seven to more than 100 members to hold title of the land in common and work the land together. Other land remains as state farms with day to day decision making determined by the farm workers. I saw several of these farms, with sizes ranging from several hundred hectares to several thousand.
The main crop is corn, the staple food eaten by most people every day, as arepas (corn flour cakes) and cachapas (ground up fresh corn cooked as a pancake). Other crops include cassava, beans, sweet potatoes, squash and rice. Fruits such as guavas, mangos, bananas, pawpaws, avocados and citrus are commonly grown.
The farming process is mechanised, with harvesting machinery provided by Argentina and tractors by Iran, Byelorussia and China. In one area, San Carlos in Cojedes State, a huge state-owned agricultural support centre has been set up, to hire out machinery to the cooperatives surrounding it. Urea was also stocked -- on questioning we were told that while agro-ecology is the policy it will be some time before some farms develop the skill and motivation to stop using chemical fertilisers and pesticides.
One farm was experimenting with organic techniques, quite successfully. Some fields were mulched with crop residue and treated with biological controls, while others were still managed chemically. The organic fields had far fewer weeds but obviously lacked some fertility. The biological controls were successful.
Biological control and biofertiliser labs are being set up across the country to produce beneficial insects and fungi, and soil inoculants. Several species of predatory wasps and lacewings are used to control caterpillars and aphids respectively; they are bred in large numbers in the laboratory and released onto the crops at the right time. Metarrhizium and Beauvaria fungi are produced to control other insect pests -- corn grubs and coffee beetles. Trichoderma fungi are used to keep root rotting diseases under control.
Biofertilisers are microbes that release nutrients out of the soil. The well-known Rhizobium is produced to assist nitrogen availability for legume crops, and Azotobacter, another nitrogen provider, and Bacillus megaterium, which releases phosphorus are also part of the lab's work. Currently the organisms are provided to farmers at no cost in order to encourage agroecology, as a temporary measure. The labs are planning to produce other microbes including mycorrhizae, another phosphorus releaser.
Seed banks and seed treatment plants have been established to provide the range of agricultural genetics suited to the various regions. The aim is to completely bypass the international corporations that supply seed around the world, and preserve the genetic diversity that has been built up in Venezuela for thousands of years. Genetically modified (GM) seeds are not allowed, though this is not ruled out in future if some are found to be safe. The precautionary principle is used. Seeds are treated with the beneficial fungus Trichoderma instead of fungicides for storage and sowing.
Agro-Ecology College -- Barinas State
We visited the Paulo Freire Latin American School of Agro-ecology, an institute set up to provide education for future advisors and teachers from around Latin America. Students are nominated by either the Via Campesina network or the Brazilian Landless Peasants' Movement. The aim is to reclaim agriculture from the neoliberal model, especially for Indigenous and Afro farmers. The stated philosophy of the school is social transformation in defence of Mother Earth, and its motto: Estudio, trabajo, organisacion con agroecologia, en la revolucion (Study, work, organisation with agro-ecology, in the revolution).
The students spend the morning in class and the afternoon in the fields doing practical work. One student was working on a pig-breeding project, mating domestic pigs with wild pigs to create hardiness, and distributing the offspring to a network of participating farmers. On weekends and for a month each year the students go out to the farming communities to live with the farmers in order to both teach and learn. The school has its own farm, producing cattle, pigs, cheese, grains and vegetables on 50 hectares. Permaculture is integrated into the education process. There are no fees to attend the school.
What does it mean for Australia?
Australia went through land reform several times in history -- the selection acts of the 1860s and 1870s, the closer settlement acts of the 1890s and the soldier settlement programs following the first and second world wars. These reforms have created a nation of family farmers. While there have been inroads by corporate farming, the majority of farmland is owned and managed by the farmers themselves. This is what people in Venezuela have been fighting for and are now achieving. In Australia we do need legislation to prevent the spread of corporate farming and protect the family farm, as several states of the USA have.
While Australian farmers do control their land, they do not have influence over the prices they receive. The Venezuelan experience shows that farmers can cooperate to obtain fair prices, and can bypass the power of the huge corporations that control food processing and distribution. This is what Australian farmers need to do, and can do. An excellent example is the Organic Dairy Farmers of Australia cooperative that sets the price of milk for its members.
The other important lesson is that governments can pursue genuinely sustainable policies. Governments can assist farmers in organising themselves, can facilitate the phase-out of chemical agriculture, and can act independently of the World Trade Organization. Supermarket chains can be broken up or nationalised to prevent them from constantly reducing the prices they pay farmers. Processors can be stopped from using the threat of cheap imports to screw producers. We need governments committed to genuine sustainability. The changes in Venezuela have enormous significance globally as they show what governments and people are capable of doing.
The significance inside Venezuela is immeasurable. A farmer on a newly founded cooperative farm at San Jose told us: "Ahora tenemos dignidad" (Now we have dignity). A few years ago that land was part of a huge estate on which the man was a labourer living in extreme poverty. When asked what will happen if the opposition wins government and tries to give the land back to the big landlords he said: "There will be civil war. We are not going to let them take our land away again".
[Alan Broughton, a member of the Australia-Venezuela Solidarity Network and the Socialist Alliance in Australlia, participated in the food sovereignty study tour to Venezuela in July 2010. AVSN organises regular solidarity brigades to Venezuela. Find out more http://venezuelasolidarity.org/?q=node/159
Urban food garden, Caracas.
By Alan Broughton
http://links.org.au/node/1855
August 20, 2010 -- A massive transformation of agriculture is occurring in Venezuela, a transformation that has lessons for every other country in the world. The Law of the Land and Agrarian Development, the Law of Food Sovereignty and Security and the Law of Integrated Agricultural Health set out the agenda (they can be found on www.mat.gob.ve, in Spanish). The policies are based on the premises that farmers should have control of their land and product, that the country should produce its own food, and that chemical fertilisers and pesticides should not be part of agriculture.
Land in Venezuela has been in the hands of about 500 families and corporations since the 1800s and worked by an impoverished peasantry. Much of the land was under utilised as cattle ranching, pulpwood plantations, export crops such as sugar cane, or left idle. Most food was imported. This land is gradually being taken over by the government and handed to local communities who have been fighting for it for two centuries.
Food sovereignty is a key government policy, guaranteed in the constitution: "Food sovereignty is the inalienable right of a nation to define and develop priorities and foods appropriate to its specific conditions, in local and national production, conserving agricultural and cultural diversity and self sufficiency and guaranteeing food supply to all the population." Food imports are only allowed if there is a shortfall of production in the country, and exports occur only after domestic demand is met.
Control over production is in the hands of farmers' cooperatives on the newly distributed lands. Assistance is provided by the government for cooperative management and to establish processing plants so the farmers are no longer victim to the power to set prices of the processors and distributors. Agriculture is planned, at three levels: the National Agrarian Assembly, the regional agrarian assemblies and the local peasants and producers councils. The regional assemblies are elected by the peasants and producers councils.
One goal is the elimination of chemical fertilisers and pesticides. Venezuela has had a long experience in their use and the change will be gradual. Agro-ecology colleges have been set up with the assistance of Cuban advisors, as Cuba went through this process 20 years ago and is now almost fully organic. Agro-ecology is promoted in all agricultural development projects, to producers and institutes.
I had the opportunity in July 2010 to visit Venezuela and see the changes that are taking place. Here are my impressions.
Urban agriculture -- Caracas
Venezuela is emulating the remarkable achievements of Cuba, where more than half of the fruit and vegetable needs of the urban population are produced within the cities. As in Cuba, the city food gardens are all organic, providing non-toxic safe fresh food to communities. The benefits of urban agriculture are seen as contributing to food security and sovereignty, improving the urban environment, supplementing the income of families, communities and schools, and fostering learning and recreational activities. The gardens are set up on unused land, at schools and, using raised beds, on concrete and balconies.
Community centres have established these gardens wherever possible. Some are in the very early stages and need more time and increased soil fertility to fully develop. One that I saw, on a former industrial site, was built on subsoil only six months ago, and was suffering the consequences, showing patchy growth and pest damage; a worm farm has been set up on that land to produce fertiliser to improve the hard soil. The community centres include a free health centre, usually a subsidised shop, a computer centre, adult education facilities and some even run a community radio.
An excellent example has been created in the median strip of a busy highway in Caracas by homeless people, former drug addicts, and is producing excellent crops. Marigolds are planted in each raised bed to provide habitat for beneficial insects, so that pests are no problem. Fertility is provided by a mixture of mountain soil and manure. When asked why the garden was unfenced, the spokesperson said that the usual local suspects for vandalism were already working on the project, so it needed no extra protection.
Cacao production and processing -- Barlovento region, Miranda State
Cacao growers, mostly descendents of former slaves brought from Africa, were until recently among the most impoverished people in the country, in a highly profitable industry. The cocoa beans were bought up cheaply by international corporations like Nestle by various means of price manipulation, and processed overseas. Now the producers are organised into cooperatives that have, with government assistance, set up factories for the primary processing into cocoa powder then into chocolate. The factories are managed by the producer's cooperative and the factory workers, who are from cacao growing families; decisions are made collectively. The price they receive has gone from 1 bolivar per kilo (about 15 cents) to 14 bolivares in three years and now provides them with a good standard of living. Still a large proportion of the beans are sold on the open market, but the government has set and enforces a minimum price that the commercial processors have to pay.
Fishing -- Chuao, Aragua State
Venezuela has the strongest fishing regulations in the world, and they are supported by the fishing people. Trawling has been phased out, fishing near reefs is prohibited, stunning devices like dynamite and poisons are not allowed, and nets cannot be left in the water -- they are just thrown out and hauled in. The size of the nets allows small fish to escape to breed or provide food for the larger fish. Sardine fishing is not done, as these are near the bottom of the food chain and needed for other fish. All fishers are organised into a local Fisher People's Council, and the National Council makes policy. The regulations are enforced by the government and the fishing people themselves, in order to provide long-term sustainable harvests. The fishing families now have education, health care, decent housing and retirement pensions, benefits they have never had before. National fish production has actually increased under these policies. The cooperatives run the cool stores and market the catch.
Field crops -- the plains states of Cojedes, Portuguesa and Yaracuy states
The central plain of Venezuela is the main food producing area, a region formerly totally dominated by huge estates. The land is gradually being redistributed to the communities that have worked the land for generations. Most of the people are Indigenous and were growing corn and beans long before the Spanish colonists arrived.
The communities that have gained control of the land have different methods of land ownership and organisation. Some communities chose to own individual plots and work together for machinery and knowledge sharing and marketing. Others form cooperatives of from seven to more than 100 members to hold title of the land in common and work the land together. Other land remains as state farms with day to day decision making determined by the farm workers. I saw several of these farms, with sizes ranging from several hundred hectares to several thousand.
The main crop is corn, the staple food eaten by most people every day, as arepas (corn flour cakes) and cachapas (ground up fresh corn cooked as a pancake). Other crops include cassava, beans, sweet potatoes, squash and rice. Fruits such as guavas, mangos, bananas, pawpaws, avocados and citrus are commonly grown.
The farming process is mechanised, with harvesting machinery provided by Argentina and tractors by Iran, Byelorussia and China. In one area, San Carlos in Cojedes State, a huge state-owned agricultural support centre has been set up, to hire out machinery to the cooperatives surrounding it. Urea was also stocked -- on questioning we were told that while agro-ecology is the policy it will be some time before some farms develop the skill and motivation to stop using chemical fertilisers and pesticides.
One farm was experimenting with organic techniques, quite successfully. Some fields were mulched with crop residue and treated with biological controls, while others were still managed chemically. The organic fields had far fewer weeds but obviously lacked some fertility. The biological controls were successful.
Biological control and biofertiliser labs are being set up across the country to produce beneficial insects and fungi, and soil inoculants. Several species of predatory wasps and lacewings are used to control caterpillars and aphids respectively; they are bred in large numbers in the laboratory and released onto the crops at the right time. Metarrhizium and Beauvaria fungi are produced to control other insect pests -- corn grubs and coffee beetles. Trichoderma fungi are used to keep root rotting diseases under control.
Biofertilisers are microbes that release nutrients out of the soil. The well-known Rhizobium is produced to assist nitrogen availability for legume crops, and Azotobacter, another nitrogen provider, and Bacillus megaterium, which releases phosphorus are also part of the lab's work. Currently the organisms are provided to farmers at no cost in order to encourage agroecology, as a temporary measure. The labs are planning to produce other microbes including mycorrhizae, another phosphorus releaser.
Seed banks and seed treatment plants have been established to provide the range of agricultural genetics suited to the various regions. The aim is to completely bypass the international corporations that supply seed around the world, and preserve the genetic diversity that has been built up in Venezuela for thousands of years. Genetically modified (GM) seeds are not allowed, though this is not ruled out in future if some are found to be safe. The precautionary principle is used. Seeds are treated with the beneficial fungus Trichoderma instead of fungicides for storage and sowing.
Agro-Ecology College -- Barinas State
We visited the Paulo Freire Latin American School of Agro-ecology, an institute set up to provide education for future advisors and teachers from around Latin America. Students are nominated by either the Via Campesina network or the Brazilian Landless Peasants' Movement. The aim is to reclaim agriculture from the neoliberal model, especially for Indigenous and Afro farmers. The stated philosophy of the school is social transformation in defence of Mother Earth, and its motto: Estudio, trabajo, organisacion con agroecologia, en la revolucion (Study, work, organisation with agro-ecology, in the revolution).
The students spend the morning in class and the afternoon in the fields doing practical work. One student was working on a pig-breeding project, mating domestic pigs with wild pigs to create hardiness, and distributing the offspring to a network of participating farmers. On weekends and for a month each year the students go out to the farming communities to live with the farmers in order to both teach and learn. The school has its own farm, producing cattle, pigs, cheese, grains and vegetables on 50 hectares. Permaculture is integrated into the education process. There are no fees to attend the school.
What does it mean for Australia?
Australia went through land reform several times in history -- the selection acts of the 1860s and 1870s, the closer settlement acts of the 1890s and the soldier settlement programs following the first and second world wars. These reforms have created a nation of family farmers. While there have been inroads by corporate farming, the majority of farmland is owned and managed by the farmers themselves. This is what people in Venezuela have been fighting for and are now achieving. In Australia we do need legislation to prevent the spread of corporate farming and protect the family farm, as several states of the USA have.
While Australian farmers do control their land, they do not have influence over the prices they receive. The Venezuelan experience shows that farmers can cooperate to obtain fair prices, and can bypass the power of the huge corporations that control food processing and distribution. This is what Australian farmers need to do, and can do. An excellent example is the Organic Dairy Farmers of Australia cooperative that sets the price of milk for its members.
The other important lesson is that governments can pursue genuinely sustainable policies. Governments can assist farmers in organising themselves, can facilitate the phase-out of chemical agriculture, and can act independently of the World Trade Organization. Supermarket chains can be broken up or nationalised to prevent them from constantly reducing the prices they pay farmers. Processors can be stopped from using the threat of cheap imports to screw producers. We need governments committed to genuine sustainability. The changes in Venezuela have enormous significance globally as they show what governments and people are capable of doing.
The significance inside Venezuela is immeasurable. A farmer on a newly founded cooperative farm at San Jose told us: "Ahora tenemos dignidad" (Now we have dignity). A few years ago that land was part of a huge estate on which the man was a labourer living in extreme poverty. When asked what will happen if the opposition wins government and tries to give the land back to the big landlords he said: "There will be civil war. We are not going to let them take our land away again".
[Alan Broughton, a member of the Australia-Venezuela Solidarity Network and the Socialist Alliance in Australlia, participated in the food sovereignty study tour to Venezuela in July 2010. AVSN organises regular solidarity brigades to Venezuela. Find out more http://venezuelasolidarity.org/?q=node/159
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